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National Security Memorandum on the Vietnam War

A word of warning on drawing firm conclusions from one or two documents. It is like trying to describe the make, model, horsepower, engine-type, color, year, etc. of an automobile by examining a single hubcap. It provides clues only.

Documents such as those below MUST be examined in broader context. These memos are drawn from thousands of documents, all of which provide necessary context and background to what the policy makers were thinking. This is particular true of documents such as NSAMs and Action memoranda, where the policy makers knew they were writing for the record. In the source from which these particular documents were drawn, there are hundreds of other cables, memos, and items which may provide considerably more insight to what was behind these specific statements. Nothing can substitute for reading as much of the available documentary record as possible.

To view a memorandum, click on its number. The layout of each text file duplicates, as much as possible, the layout of the original memorandum.

Number Date Title/Excerpt
111 November 22, 1961 The U.S. Government is prepared to join the Viet-Nam Government in a sharply increased joint effort to avoid a further deterioration in the situation in South Viet-Nam.
162 June 19, 1962 Development of U.S. and Indigenous Police, Paramilitary, and Military Resources

More Special Forces personnel will be assigned to support CIA covert paramilitary operations where acute insurgency situations exist.

519 October2, 1963 Summary Record of the 519th Meeting of the National Security Council White House, Washington
263 October 11, 1963 South Vietnam The President ... directed that no formal announcement be made of the implementation of plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. miltitary personnel by the end of 1963.
273 Draft 11/21/63 See excerpts from 273 below
273 November 26, 1963 The objectives of the United States with respect to the withdrawal of U. S. military personnel remain as stated in the White House statement of October 2, 1963.

8. With respect to Laos, a plan should be a developed and submitted for approval by higher authority for military operations up to a line up to 50 kilometers inside Laos,

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